W e consider the role of security in the maintenance of an automated system, controlled by a network of sensors and simple computing devices. Such systems are widely used in transportation, utilities, healthcare, and manufacturing. Devices in the network are subject to traditional failures that can lead to a larger system failure if not repaired. However, the devices are also subject to security breaches that can also lead to catastrophic system failure. These security breaches could result from either cyber attacks (such as viruses, hackers, or terrorists) or physical tampering. We formulate a stochastic model of the system to examine the repair policies for both real and suspected failures. We develop a linear programming-based model for optimizing repair priorities. We show that, given the state of the system, the optimal repair policy follows a unique threshold indicator (either work on the real failures or the suspected ones). We examine the behavior of the optimal policy under different failure rates and threat levels. Finally, we examine the robustness of our model to violations in the underlying assumptions and find the model remains useful over a range of operating assumptions.
Introduction
Distributed control systems form the information and control backbone of most large automated systems like factories, hospitals, utilities, and mass transit systems. Sometimes called supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems or process control systems (PCS), these networks of sensors, simple controlling devices, routers, and computers, were once isolated networks uniquely designed for their intended purpose. With the rapid rise in enterprise software, many of these control systems have been integrated into wider corporate networks and further exposed to the Internet. Bringing such systems onto larger networks has many advantages including ease of data movement, remote control, and better integration of related business processes. For example, nurse-patient communication systems allow continuous patient monitoring and improved care. Likewise, remote patient monitoring in home settings allow patients to be treated at home, avoiding costly hospital stays (Greg 2013) . In process industries, SCADA systems facilitate detailed metrics on the utilization of capital equipment that can be rolled up and presented in broader management dashboards. In discrete manufacturing environments, information tracked on the progress of a customer's order on the shop floor can be used to advise customers on shipping dates and tracked in a customer relationship management system. Moreover, wireless technologies have made networking factory devices even easier and less expensive, further accelerating this network convergence. For example, General Motors (GM) used to manage many separate control networks but has integrated those onto an Ethernet backbone using wireless technology (Hochmuth 2005) .
However, opening these control systems to wider access also brings new security risks. For example, hospitals are increasingly reliant on sophisticated networks of wireless sensors and mobile devices to monitor patients. Such patient monitoring systems have been shown to have significant security weakness (Gold 2013 ) that could lead to failure resulting in patient harm or death. Since many SCADA and PCS applications were designed prior to the rise of Internet security fears, they were not engineered to incorporate sophisticated security provisions. In fact, many were designed without any security or implemented with security features effectively disabled (for example, passwords never changed from their default settings). Moreover,
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INFORMS Journal on Computing 27(1), pp. 103-117, © 2015 INFORMS these isolated control systems in many cases were not updated or patched against known vulnerabilities. When integrated into the wider networks, these control systems can become susceptible to everyday viruses, worms, and hackers. Devices that become infected could fail or continue operating in a less reliable state. Moreover, they could harbor malware that lies dormant until some later time when activation leads to immediate failure. A more insidious risk is that devices that appear to operate acceptably may in fact have been compromised. For example, a sensor that continues to report normal operation of the machine it is monitoring, when in fact the machine is running out of control. Sometimes, remote diagnoses can detect abnormalities without showing conclusive failure.
For example, an Australian man attacked the Maroochy Shire's wastewater SCADA system that controlled the flow of waste through the complex system. Using a wireless device, he was able to open release valves at a sewage treatment plant, dumping foul-smelling sludge into local parks and rivers. Before being caught, he had successfully pirated control 45 times and dumped 264,000 gallons of sewage, according to the Government Accounting Office (Antunes 2005) . More recently, in 2011 an Illinois water utility reported that its pumping systems had been hacked. Attackers reportedly enabled and disabled a pump repeatedly, eventually damaging it (Bradley 2011) .
Other recent examples of similar security failures in SCADA systems have occurred in the production of electricity and the distribution grid itself (Antunes 2005) . In 2001, hackers were able to exploit a known weakness in the Sun's Solaris server systems and successfully installed some malware that would allow them to control 75% of California's power grid. Thankfully, in the 17 days before discovery, they caused little trouble. In 2003, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Ohio crashed for five hours as a result of the "slammer" worm. Although the failure of the nuclear power plant's control network generated much concern, no harmful releases occurred during the episode. The possibility of such attacks made world headlines when the Stuxnet computer worm, believed to be developed by the United States and Israel, successfully destroyed Iranian nuclear centrifuges in [2009] [2010] . Recent reports show the escalation of such military use of SCADA attacks (Gellman and Nakashima 2013) .
Despite the fact that many firms have increased their investment in security technologies, the FBI Computer Crime Surveys show that enterprises continue to suffer myriad attacks with many incidents going unreported (Brenner 2006) . Security breaches create new sources of maintenance burdens on repair resources (people and diagnostic computing devices) and open new questions on how best to allocate limited maintenance resources.
Cyber attacks often result in physical equipment failures that look like normal failures; for example, causing a device to repeatedly cycle through different speeds or states to cause fatigue and failure. Even if small security failures do not immediately translate into large-scale system failure, learning from those "nearmisses" has been shown to be an important element in avoiding larger systems failures (Phimister et al. 2003) . Of course, traditional maintenance activities have long been an important area for ensuring the productivity and continuity of control systems. GM alone spends more than $1 billion in maintenance of its factory systems (Hochmuth 2005) . Maintenance management in private and public sectors has motivated research on a wide variety of related problems. However, our focus is to develop models that help prioritize a response to possible security failures of SCADA systems. A Department of Homeland Security report (USDHS 2006) identified such modeling tools and processes as important elements to enhance the speed of response to a cascading failure. Recent industrial research has focused on continuous monitoring of SCADA systems to profile predictable behavior and identify potential failures (Higgins 2013) .
Our work resides at the intersection of several substantial streams of work. Operations researchers have been interested in repair problems for more than 50 years (cf. Barlow and Proschan 1996) . Problems more closely related to ours are found in the literature of maintaining deteriorating systems (Klein 1962 , McCall 1963 , where the state of the system is not directly observable or is costly to observe (Eckles 1968) . Much of this work is focused on single-unit systems; see Wang (2002) for a detailed survey. Another type of problem similar to ours is the machine interference problem (MIP). Models of this type consider a finite set of (different) operating machines maintained by a group of (specialized) repairmen. To the best of our knowledge, none of the models of this type takes into account the deterioration process (see Haque and Armstrong 2007 for a detailed survey of existing models).
For our multi-item system, structural dependence prevents simple reductions to the single-item case (as in most of the works on deteriorating systems). On the other hand, in our system (as will be seen in the discussion of our objective functions) failure of a single component does not necessarily imply system failure. In fact, several devices may fail and the overall system may continue without incident. However, it is often not clear to engineers how many devices can fail without causing a major incident. For example, a failure on a pipe-valve controller in an oil refinery typically results in the valve moving to a failsafe mode (open or closed, depending on the situation) and other redundancies are often in place. Of course, failures must be quickly repaired but the Downloaded from informs.org by [130.115.80 .128] on 05 December 2014, at 10:32 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. 105 system may be safely operated for some time after such a failure. However, if several controllers have failed, the overall system will reach a failure state. This leads us to focus on objectives like the probability of exceeding k-out-of-N failed devices. De Smidt-Destombes et al. (2006) consider the inventory policy of a k-out-of-N system with wear-out. In their work, devices can be in one of three states: working, deteriorated, or failed. Like such previous research on such deteriorating systems, our focus is on providing reliable operation of the total system by minimizing the expected number of failed components or the probability of k failed components. However, unlike the previous research on deteriorating systems, we consider devices that are also subject to suspected security failures that could be real failures, later result in real failures, or be false alarms with no real danger. Understanding how to manage maintenance resources in this new world of security concerns is an important new area of study. In our system, devices can (and must) be restored-typically through software patches or physical repairs. Thus, inventory, as in De Smidt-Destombes et al. (2006), is not the key issue in this paper. Rather, our focus is on optimal use of the repair resources themselves as its capacity is the key limitation.
From a modeling point of view, our problem is also similar to some of the work on restless bandit problems. These problems have been widely underconsidered in recent years (cf. Gittins et al. 2011; Niño-Mora 1996, 2000; Mitchell 2002, Glazebrook et al. 2005; Niño-Mora 2008 . The most similar, from our point of view, are the problems considered in Glazebrook and Mitchell (2002) , Glazebrook et al. (2005) . In those papers, the authors consider a repair model for a group of continuously improving/deteriorating machines and the question is how to schedule repairmen such that a certain cost function is minimized. They present a scheduling heuristic based on Whittle's indices (Whittle 1988 ) and develop theoretical bounds on heuristic performance.
Another similar model can be found in Tiemessen and van Houtum (2013) , where the authors analyze different policies for dynamic repair priorities using a Markov decision process (MDP) formulation and simulations.
Here, we treat the system as a two-class priority queue where the server chooses jobs from different queues such that a certain objective is optimized. In this respect, our research is also related to the large stream of work in multiclass queues with service priorities (cf. Cobham 1954 , Davis 1966 , Jaiswal 1968 . Recent developments in that area are focused, however, on measurements of system performance rather than on optimization (cf. Wagner 1996 Wagner , 1998 Sleptchenko et al. 2005; and Harchol-Balter et al. 2005) , or require work conservation laws that would allow optimization of processing priorities using a polyhedral approach (cf. Bertsimas and Niño-Mora 1996) .
In the model considered in this paper, conservation laws do not hold since jobs can change their type and service time (real failure after suspected). In our multiclass, closed system the optimal priority policy shifts dynamically with the state of the system. We develop a stochastic model for a maintenance system, where the server (or repairman) is faced with two types of failures: "real" and "suspected." Each failure type can be resolved by the server at different rates. In addition, devices in a suspected failure state may transition to a "real" failure, since the devices with suspected failures are still operating. Given an appropriate (linear) objective function related to the overall system integrity, we develop the optimal repair policy. We present an exact linear programming-(LP)-based optimization technique for determining a time-independent, statedependent scheduling policy. Such an optimization technique is tractable because the closed system results in a modest state space (two-dimensional and finite). Our approach using standard LP techniques allows us to optimize discrete priority rules. A similar property was shown for systems where conservation laws hold (cf. Bertsimas and Niño-Mora 1996) . However, for our problem the conservation laws do not hold. Therefore, optimal processing priorities are state-dependent and require an approach based on MDPs. Using techniques from queueing theory, we show how to reduce state and action space. For example, direct use of MDP theory would require working on 2 ⇥ 3 N -dimensional problem (N machines with three states each and two actions in each state), whereas using our approach we can formulate the problem as an 4N 4N É 155/2-dimensional optimization problem.
We begin by formulating the model ( §2). We show that a relaxed formulation where the repair resource chooses the next device to be repaired with some probability results in a deterministic optimal policy ( §3). We derive generalized priority assignment rules for some partial cases ( §4) and examine the behavior of the optimal policy in other generic settings ( §5). Finally, we examine the robustness of our model to violations in the underlying assumptions ( §6).
Model Formulation

Optimization Problem
We consider a system with N operating devices that are subject to two failure types: "real" and "suspected." The "real" failures occur at rate ã 1 for each device, and we refer to these as "real" because they are instantly identified with certainty. The devices are also subject to "suspected" failures at rate ã 2 for each device. Suspected failures may be real failures (for example, with some probability g 0) or may lead to real failures. Unfortunately, the true condition of devices suffering from suspected failures cannot be known with certainty unless they transition to a real failure mode (with rate ã 12 ) or are inspected by the repair server.
We assume that the interfailure times are exponentially distributed. Thus, the repair system has two flows of arrivals that occur according to nonstationary Poisson processes, with rates that depend on the number of working devices. That is, given that n 1 is the number of devices with "real" failures and n 2 is the number with "suspected" failures, the systems arrival rates will be: 4N É 4n 1 + n 2 55ã 1 -arrival rate of "real" failures, 4N É 4n 1 + n 2 55ã 2 -arrival rate of "suspected" failures. In addition, the devices that are already in a "suspected" failure state can have a real failure. Thus we have an additional stream of "real" failures with system rate: n 2 ã 12 -rate of "real" failures occurring in devices with a "suspected" failure.
We consider a system with a single repair server that processes failures of both types with rates å 1 and å 2 for real and suspected failures, respectively (service times are exponentially distributed). Since the considered system is Markovian (i.e., interarrival and service times are memoryless), it is logical to assume that the optimal dynamic processing priorities do not depend on the current state of the interarrival and service processes or on the processing history. That is, they depend only on the current numbers of failures in the system. We solve for the optimal state-dependent processing policy (dynamic processing priorities). Namely, the server chooses to process "real" failures with parameter Å n 1 1 n 2 , and correspondingly "suspected" failures with parameter 1 É Å n 1 1 n 2 . We relax the optimization problem by allowing parameters Å n 1 1 n 2 to be continuous (Å n 1 1 n 2 2 601 17). For this relaxation, Å n 1 1 n 2 can be interpreted as the state-dependent probabilities that the server chooses to process "real" or "suspected" failures. Later we will show that, in cases with linear objective functions, the optimal parameters Å n 1 1 n 2 obtained from the relaxed problem are always integer (i.e., Å n 1 1 n 2 2 801 19). Finally, we assume that the server follows a preemptive priority discipline, which means that the server will postpone processing of the device currently in service if the current scheduling rule (parameter Å n 1 1 n 2 ) dictates the server to process a device with the other type of failure. That is, preemption might occur after each failure event. However, our approach can be directly applied to systems with a nonpreemptive discipline at the expense of a larger state space.
In our analysis, we consider two different objective functions. The choice of objective function to apply in any real situation depends on the nature of the real and suspected failures and their relationship to the overall system integrity.
Objective 1 (O1). Minimize the probability of the event that n 1 + n 2 g > d.
This objective (O1) function is most appropriate in cases where exceeding a certain level of failures (real and suspected) may lead to catastrophic system failure so we wish to minimize the probability of such an outcome. Notice that a special case of this objective is where we only measure real failures (g = 0).
Objective 2 (O2). Minimize the weighted sum of expected "real" and "suspected" failures 4aE6n 1 7 + bE6n 2 75.
This objective is more appropriate in cases where the overall system performance degrades linearly in the number of real and suspected failures, where a and b represent the relative impact of a real or suspected failure. If g 0 is interpreted as the probability that the suspected failure is actually a real one (independent of the system state), then setting a = 1, b = g gives the expected number of failures. If the objective is to minimize the expected number of real failures, set a = 1 and b = 0 in objective O2.
Solving for a Given Priority Assignment
The multiclass closed system with preemptive priority behaves like a Markov process with finite state space. The states of the system can be described by the 2-tuple 4n 1 1 n 2 5, which represents the number of real and suspected failures, respectively, with transition rates as illustrated in Figure 1 .
Given these transition rates, the equilibrium equations for the system states probabilities can be obtained by equating the flow out of state 4n 1 1 n 2 5 and the flow into state 4n 1 1 n 2 5: 
Figure 1 Flow Diagrams for Different System States
Note that Å n 1 1 n 2 = 1 when n 2 = 0, and Å n 1 1 n 2 = 0 when
Although the system states probabilities p n 1 1 n 2 have double indexation, we can assume that they are elements of a column vector p, ordered in, for example, a lexicographical manner; i.e., p = 4p 01 0 1 p 01 1 1 p 11 0 1 p 21 0 1 p 11 1 1 p 01 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 p 01N 1 0 0 0 1 p N 10 5. Then we can write this system of equilibrium equations as a system linear equation of size 4N + 25 · 4N + 15/2 ⇥ 4N + 254N + 15/2 plus the normalization equation: pQ = 01 pe T = 10
For certain orders of the probabilities p n 1 1 n 2 in the vector p, the matrix Q will have a three-diagonal block form (see the appendix for more details) and it is easy to see that we have a finite nonhomogeneous two-dimensional quasi-birth-death (QBD) process.
We can solve this system exactly for all the state probabilities, given specific system parameters (Å n 1 1 n 2 , ã 1 , ã 2 , etc.) applying known techniques (cf. Latouche and Ramaswami 1999, Neuts 1981) . However, our focus here is the development of an optimization procedure to determine parameters Å n 1 1 n 2 . Note that our optimization procedure can be easily adapted for finding the steady state probabilities given certain Ås by introducing additional constraints.
Optimization of the Priority
Assignment (for a Linear Objective Function)
Our goal is to find probabilities p n 1 1 n 2 and parameter
such that a linear objective function is minimized and the equilibrium equations are satisfied:
where vector Å is defined in the same way as vector p.
Although the equation pQ4¡5 = 0 is nonlinear, we can use the structure of the generator Q4¡5 and formulate a linear optimization problem. For this we introduce variables y n 1 1 n 2 = p n 1 1 n 2 Å n 1 1 n 2 that will allow us to rewrite the constraints (1) of the optimization as:
where matrix L contains all the terms of the matrix pQ4¡5 without probabilities Å n 1 1 n 2 and matrix M contains all the terms corresponding to probabilities Å n 1 1 n 2 (see the appendix for more details).
Thus we obtain a linear program with 4N + 25 · 4N + 15/2 + N 4N É 15/2 variables (taking into account that Å n 1 1 n 2 are fixed for n 1 or n 2 equal to 0), with in Lemma 2). Moreover, we also show that the optimal Ås are always integer.
Lemma 1. For any feasible vector of priority parameters 0  ¡  1 the finite-state Markov chain describing our maintenance system has a unique stationary distribution with nonzero probabilities of each state.
Proof. This lemma follows immediately from the fact that the system is finite and irreducible. The first is obvious. The second fact means that if the system at a certain moment is in a specific state (any state), then there is a positive probability that it will move to any other state in finite time. This follows from the fact that any state can be reached from the state with zero machines in repair, and the zero state can be reached from any other because the repair server is always working unless there are no failures in the system. É Lemma 2. There is a one-to-one correspondence between the pairs 4p1 ¡5 and 4p1 y5 that corresponds to the optimal solutions of the initial optimization problem (1) and of the LP problem (2).
Proof. As it is shown in Lemma 1, for each priority vector ¡ there is a unique vector p. The uniqueness of vector y for each vector ¡ follows then from its definition (y
). Assume now that vector y is known. Using standard knowledge from the theory of finite-state Markov chains (cf. Latouche and Ramaswami 1999) and linear algebra, it is possible to show that the rank of the system of linear equations from problem (2):
is equal to the dimension of the state space (dim4p5). This means that for each vector y we will have a unique vector p. If both of these vectors satisfy the inequalities of problem (2): p É y 01 y 01 then pair 4p1 y5 will give us unique vector ¡ satisfying the constraints of problem (1). É Theorem 1. The optimal parameter Å n 1 1 n 2 always takes integer values; i.e., Å ?
Proof. It is known from the optimization theory (cf. Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis 1997) that the optimal solution of a LP problem lies normally on one of the vertices of the feasible polytope. In other words, a necessary condition for a feasible point to be the optimal solution is that the number of active constraints in this point is greater than or equal to the number of variables (problem dimension). As in Lemma 2, it is possible to show that the rank of the system of linear equations pL + yM = 01 pe T = 1 is equal to the dimension of the state space (dim4p5). This means that in the optimal solution the number of active inequalities from the group p É y 01 y 0 must be greater than or equal to the number of y-variables (dim4y5). Assume now that there is an optimal solution of system (1) with at least one variable 0 < Å
= 0). The last fact assumes that our Markov problem will have states with zero probability, which contradicts Lemma 1. That is, the optimal priority parameters obtained from the optimal solution of the LP problem (2) will always take integer values. É
Generalizable Priority Assignments
The structure of the optimal repair priorities depend on the objective function and the other system parameters (failure and service rates). Moreover, the conservation laws do not hold in our problem, since the arrival (failure) rates depend on the number of working devices and thus depend on the processing rules. For example, setting high processing priority to the "suspected" failures will increase the number in queue with "real" failures (and thus, the number of working devices will be lower). So, the available results that employ conservation laws are not applicable for our system. However, in some conditions we can find generalizable priority rules, i.e., rules when one job type always gets priority over the other, regardless of the state of the system. The following lemmas present conditions for such priority rules.
Lemma 3. If the objective function requires minimization of probabilities of system states with high n 1 (e.g., Objectives O1, O2 with g of b equal to zero) and the "real" failure rate of the devices with already discovered "suspected" failure is not higher than the failure rate of the "new" ones (ã 12 É ã 1  0), then the optimal repair policy is to always repair the devices with "real" failures.
Proof. The probability P 1 n 1 of having n 1 "real" failures in the system can be expressed as (summation of the equilibrium equations): Note that the minimization of P 1 n 1 would require the maximization of Å n 1 1 n 2 . Maximization Å n 1 1 n 2 will cause E6n 2 ó n 1 É 17 to increase since the queue with "suspected" failures is not processed. However, in cases with ã 12 É ã 1  0, an increase of E6n 2 ó n 1 É 17 will produce even smaller probabilities P 1 n 1 . That is, in cases with ã 12 É ã 1  0 the "real" failures should be processed first. É Thus in cases where we are only concerned with real failures and ã 12 É ã 1  0, we want to keep devices in the "suspected" state, since the devices in the "suspected" state have lower "real" failure rate and thus the total "real" failure rates would be lower.
Lemma 4. The total number of failures can be minimized by setting higher priority to jobs with shortest expected processing time.
Proof. When the objective is based on the total number of jobs in the queue, we can sum up the equilibrium equations along n 1 + n 2 = n and get the recursive relations for the total probability P T n as:
Then, to minimize probability P T n we have to maximize Å n 1 1 n 2 if å 1 É å 2 > 0, or minimize Å n 1 1 n 2 if å 1 É å 2 < 0. That is, the optimal priorities depend only on the processing rates and not on the system state. É 10 s 10 s 10 s 9 s R 9 s R 9 s s 8 s R R 8 s R R 8 s s R 7 s R R R 7 s R R R 7 s s s R 6 s R R R R 6 s R R R R 6 s s s R R 5 s R R R R R
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Developing a Plan Using Computational Results
For other combinations of the input parameters, the optimal priority assignment will not always have absolute priority of one type of failure over another.
To study such cases we performed a large number of experiments with different parameters and have highlighted only the most interesting combinations. Namely, we fixed the following system parameters: N = 10, ã 1 = 1, ã 2 = 1, ã 12 = 3, å 1 = 5 and calculated different priority assignments for different combinations of the remaining system parameters (å 2 , g, d, a, and b).
In the case of the "k-out-of-N " problem (Objective O1, g = 0, d = 4) the optimal priorities will have the following as shown in Figure 2 . This figure clearly indicates that when the service rate of the "suspected" failures increases, it becomes more important to give high priority in certain system states to the "suspected" failures. This is because in keeping the number of the suspected failures low, we will lower the chance of real failures (note here that ã 12 > ã 1 ; otherwise we get the case described by Lemma 3). However, along the border of the maximized area (n 1 = d), it is optimal to assign higher priority to the "real" failures, such that the system moves more quickly into the "safe" area.
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n 2 n 2 2 = 7 2 = 9 2 = 7.1 2 = 11 2 = 7.5 2 = 12 Figure 3 Optimal Priority Assignments for the Objective O1 with g = 005 and d = 6
(with g > 0). In this case, the "safe" area with functioning systems is below the diagonal (or stepwise diagonal) line, as shown in Figures 3-5. Minimization of "weighted" probability P 4n 1 + gn 2 > d5 with d = 6, different values of g (0.5, 0.8, 1.3), and different service rates å 2 of the "suspected" failures gives us the following priority assignments as shown in Figures 3-5 . Here, as in the case with g = 0, the "suspected" failures get higher priority more often if they have higher service rate å 2 .
The previous experiments also indicate that, for higher weight g the "suspected" failures start getting higher priority for lower service rate å 2 . This conclusion is confirmed by further experiments with the weight g (Figure 6 ), where all system parameters (except for g) 10 s 10 s 10 s 9 s R 9 s R 9 s R 8 s R R 8 s R R 8 s R R 7 s R R R 7 s R R R 7 s R R R 6 s R R R R 6 s R R R R 6 s R R R R 5 s R R R R R 5 s R R R R R 5 s R R R R R 4 s R R R R R R 4 s R R R R R R 4 s R R R R R R 3 s R R R R R R R 3 s R R R R R R R 3 s R R R R R s s 2 s R R R R R R R R 2 s R R R R R R R s 2 s R R R R s s s s 1 s R R R R R R R R R 1 s R R R R R s s s s 1 s R R R R s s s s s 0 -R R R R R R R R R R 0 -R R R R R R R R R R 0 -R R R R R R R R R R 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 R R R R R R R R R R 0 -R R R R R R R R R R 0 -R R R R R R R R R R 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 are fixed to the values as indicated in the first paragraph of this section and in the caption of Figure 6 . These sets of experiments (Figures 3-6 ) also clearly indicate that it is quite difficult to derive rules of thumb for optimal priority assignments and the optimization method presented in §3 is needed.
In optimization of the repair priorities, following objective O2, there is no clearly defined zone with the probabilities that have to be maximized (or minimized). Therefore, it is even more difficult to define rules of thumb for optimal priority assignment (except for the cases described in Lemmas 3 and 4).
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Figure 6 Optimal Priority Assignments for the Objective O1 for Different Values of g 4å 1 = 15, å 2 = 85 is equal to a. Otherwise, optimization is necessary and the priority assignment will behave as shown in Figure 8 . It can also be clearly seen in the last experiment that the priority assignments are quite sensitive to the service rates even in the case with relatively large differences between weights (Figure 8) . R R R R R R R R R R 0 -R R R R R R R R R R 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Simulation
To examine the robustness of our optimal policies to violations in the underlying assumptions, we simulated systems under a wide range of operating conditions. In the experiments, we tested six groups of priority assignments corresponding to different objective functions (see Figure 9 , left-hand side). All assignments were obtained by optimizing the corresponding objectives with the system parameters shown in the bottom of the figure (common parameters) and next to each priority assignment (specific for each priority assignment). For each priority assignment, different combinations of square coefficients (C 2 x = 008, 1, 1.25) for interfailure and service process were tested. This yielded 3 5 = 243 Table 1 Example Simulation Output Illustrating Representative Performance Priority assignment 13 Priority assignment 14
Figure 9
Scenario Settings combinations for each priority assignment for a total of 18 · 3 5 = 41374 experiments. In each simulation, four performance estimators were measured: P 4n 1  N É k5, P 4n 1 + gn 2  d5, E6n 1 7, and aE6n 1 7 + bE6n 2 7 with parameters a, b, g, and d as indicated in Figure 9 .
In scenarios where we employed the exponential distribution, we implemented the simulation to exploit its unique properties. For cases where we simulated nonexponential processing and interfailure times, distributions were generated using the first two moments in one of the following distributions:
(a) Erlang (E k1 kÉ1 ), for 0 < c x < 1, (b) HyperExponential, for c x > 1, where c x = p Var6x7/E6x7. Each simulation was started in the state with all devices working and run for 104,000 time units, disregarding the first 4,000 time units to eliminate the effects of initial transient bias (Kelton and Law 2000 117 failures or the suspected ones) and that the repair priorities can be found using a compact LP formulation. In addition, we examined the behavior of the optimal policy under different failure rates and objectives and presented a number of rules that can provide priority assignment in certain conditions without using the LP model. Our models help prioritize a response to possible security failures of SCADA systems. We illustrated that it is often optimal to focus on suspected device failures to avoid catastrophic system failure. Finally, we examined the robustness of our model to violations in the underlying assumptions and found that the model remains useful in cases with higher variability in interfailure and repair times. We also demonstrated that systems with lower variability in interfailure and repair times are more sensitive and require a different modeling approach for the stochastic processes and corresponding optimization model. Further examination of such systems would present an interesting direction for future research.
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